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LOCATION AND LIFE: HOW STENBERG V. CARHART
UNDERCUT ROE V. WADE
RICHARD STITH*
On January 22, 1973, in its decision entitled Roe v. Wade, the
Supreme Court of the United States declared that a fetus enjoys no
constitutional protection at any time before birth. Abortion must be
available on an elective basis before viability, in that neither federal
nor state law may require any maternal health reason for the
procedure. Even after viability, the fetus counts only as a "potentiality of human life" and can therefore be destroyed for broadly
defined maternal health reasons, amounting virtually to elective
abortion, right up to birth.' Location-in or out of the womb-thus
determined whether actual human life existed and whether it was
constitutionally protected under the Roe v. Wade ruling.
Many years later, some physicians began using the "partialbirth" method of abortion, destroying the fetus at a point when
induced delivery was almost complete. The following description of
this method, given by a nurse eyewitness, was presented later to the
Supreme Court. The doctor had pulled the body of the fetus, up to
the head, out of the mother's uterus. In the words of the nurse:
The baby's little fingers were clasping and unclasping, and his
little feet were kicking. Then the doctor stuck the scissors in the
back of his head, and the baby's arms jerked out, like a startle
reaction, like a flinch, like a baby does when he thinks he is
going to fall.
The doctor opened up the scissors, stuck a high-powered
suction tube into the opening, and sucked the baby's brains out.
Now the baby went completely limp. H.R. 1833 Hearing 18
(statement of Brenda Pratt Shafer).'

* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University. J.D., Ph.D., Yale University.

1. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). After spelling out the right to
'postviability" abortions for maternal health reasons, Roe directs the reader to its companion
case, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). Roe, 410 U.S. at 165. Doe, in turn, indicates that,
to the Court, the word "health" includes all factors-even "psychological" and
"familial"-relevant to maternal wellbeing. Doe, 410 U.S. at 192. Even after viability, Roe
continues to refer to the fetus as only "the potentiality of human life" and permits states to
leave it entirely unprotected. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162, 164-65.
2. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 1007 (2000) (as quoted in the dissenting opinion
of Justice Clarence Thomas). The State of Nebraska's defines partial birth abortion as "an
abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally
a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing the delivery. 28-326(9)."
Id.
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Thirty American states responded by prohibiting this procedure,
attempting to protect the fetus as soon as it was located largely
outside the womb. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia agreed
with them, calling this procedure the "killing of a human child" by
"live-birth abortion,"3 but he was in the minority. In the name of
Roe v. Wade, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down such
bans as unconstitutional in the case of Stenberg v. Carhart,dated
June 28, 2000.4
The concurring opinions of Justices John Paul Stevens and
Ruth Bader Ginsburg do not deny that this procedure is, in their
words, "brutal" and "gruesome,"5 and "cruel" and "painful."6 But
they argue that any prohibition of it is "simply irrational" because
it is no more brutal, gruesome, cruel or painful than intrauterine
mid- and late-pregnancy abortion where the still-unborn fetus is
dismembered alive, with its limbs and then its body pulled out piece
by piece before its head is finally crushed.7 In other words, the two
Justices think it irrational for a state to regard a fetus as more
worthy of legal protection simply because it is nearly born, located
outside the womb up to its neck.
Like these concurring opinions, the Court majority opinion
treats fetal location as irrelevant. For the majority, the fact that the
fetus is mostly born when the procedure in question causes its death
is no reason at all for greater state protection.5
Recall, however, that the Court founded the 1973 Roe decision
on the idea that the location of a fetus, in or out of the womb, is
determinative of its humanity and its right to life. The Justices'
opinions in Stenberg treated that foundational idea-that location
can determine nature and rights-as so irrational that it is not even
considered. Has Stenberg thus undercut the cardinal principle of
Roe that perinatal location matters?
Looking back, we shall see that the Roe opinion contained the
seeds of its own destruction, and that it had gradually disintegrated
for twenty-seven years before the Stenberg case. Stenberg may have
merely brought that process to its completion, implicitly overruling
Roe. This deconstruction of the locationary wall erected by Roe
3. Id. at 953 (dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia). Besides Justices Thomas and Scalia,
Justice Anthony Kennedy and Chief Justice William Rehnquist also dissented.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 946 (concurring opinion of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg).
6. Id. at 952 (concurring opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, citing
opinion of Judge Richard Posner in Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999)).
7. 530 U.S. at 924-26, 938-46.
8. Id. at 930. For further analysis of the Stenberg opinions, see infra notes 48-63 and
accompanying discussion.
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means that the right to destroy life in the womb is now constitutionally free to expand beyond the process of birth. This Article
examines the conceptual strategies that might secure abortion
rights while halting this expansion to some degree.
The Roe Court's Naive Realism
From the beginning, the Roe decision contained a deep contradiction, which can be understood as a conflict between nominalism
and a sort of realism. The Court asserted in Roe, in effect, that the
unborn child has no real nature and that what the courts call it is
solely a matter of semantic convention. Yet the Court assumed that
the moment of birth marked an essential difference, a real, not
merely conventional, transition to a living entity human in nature.
This "birth wall" shielded the rest of us from the vulnerability
legally imposed on fetuses.
The Roe Court's nominalism is revealed most simply in the
majority opinion of Justice Harry Blackmun, who asserts that the
Court "need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins"9
in order to justify the Court's requirement that legislators treat the
fetus at most as "the potentiality of human life" right up to the
moment of birth. 10 There is no need to answer this question, he
says, because the diversity of answers given by others shows the
question to be unanswerable, at least at present. Yet surely the law
may take controvertible stands, and it may seek to minimize the
possible harm of error even where it has no access to truth.
Blackmun's insistence that what we call the fetus does not matter,
implies a much more radical agnosticism: the assumption that the
names we give to unborn human beings are wholly conventional,
that one can in principle never say that abortion really takes a
human life.
Blackmun's justificatory history of permissive abortion
practices bears out this appearance of deep-seated nominalism. In
order to decide whether practices of past ages are justified today, we
ought to look not only at the practices themselves (i.e., practices of
permitting abortion), but also at the beliefs about values and facts
upon which societies based those practices. If those underlying
values now seem to us quite mistaken, the practices arising from
those beliefs acquire no precedential authority for us today.1 '
9. 410 U.S. at 159.
10. Id. at 164-65.
11. For example, if we looked only at historical popularity, there is one legal and moral
practice we ought to adopt immediately. It has existed in almost every major civilization from
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Similarly, we cannot honestly invoke the authority of past scientific
conclusions if we now see that the data upon which the science of
the past based its conclusions were incomplete or mistaken. If we
seek to know what is real, we cannot rest content with labels, we
must inquire into reasons.
Yet, throughout Justice Blackmun's lengthy surveys of past
practices allowing abortion, 2 he never once asks whether the beliefs
upon which those societies based practices are in fact ones that he
considers admirable or accurate. By contrast, he occasionally does
try to rebut past reasons for restrictingabortion-such as to protect
the mother's life."
For example, Blackmun refers often to "quickening" as a
popular dividing line, without once mentioning that modern medical
knowledge shows this "event," as he calls it, 4 to be an illusion. The
overall impression that Blackmun gives is that whether and when
the law permits abortion is an open choice, with most cultures
opting for abortion."
earliest history right down to the nineteenth century. I am speaking of slavery. Why do we
not imitate past social practices and reintroduce slavery? Obviously, we reject slavery
because we think these the peoples of the past based the acceptance of this practice upon
unacceptable values (as in the ancient world, where the intrinsic dignity of human beings was
not an article of faith) or erroneous facts (the myth of black inferiority that helped support the
American slave system). Consequently, this almost universal historical practice of slavery
provides no precedent whatsoever for the reintroduction of slavery today.
Similarly, it may be that those pre-twentieth century societies that permitted abortion
have always done so for reasons that we today would reject. For example, Justice Blackmun
appeals to ancient Rome and Greece for precedent, but the ancient world lacked both modern
scientific knowledge of life in the womb and our modern belief in the sanctity of the human
individual. Rome, for example, permitted what our modem law considers infanticide as well
as abortion. On the other hand, Hippocrates, the author of the Hippocratic Oath, which
stands as the great ethical foundation of modern medicine, believed both in the continuity and
in the sanctity of life - and the Oath forbids abortion. Which precedent is more compelling
should depend on which underlying beliefs we today find more plausible.
During many of the Christian centuries there was a widely-held biological theory
which placed the beginning of life at what was called "quickening" ("quick" here meaning
'alive"), which supposedly occurred in mid-pregnancy. One can hardly fault these centuries
for considering abortion less serious prior to quickening, because even though they believed
in our modern value of the individual, their facts were wrong. We now know that quickening
designates only the mother's sudden perception of movement, rather than an infusion of life.
In fact, we now know that bodily movement begins very early in pregnancy, and heartbeat
still earlier, long before it can be perceived without the aid of medical instruments. Two
centuries ago a morally serious person could permit early abortion because she could honestly
believe that life had not yet begun, but this position could not be honestly and seriously so
grounded today.
12. 410 U.S. at 129-41, 160-61.
13. Id. at 148-49.
14. Id. at 160.
15. If, on the other hand, Justice Blackmun had factored out all erroneous medical data
as well as all purely religious doctrines about ensoulment and the like, especially the ones in
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At the same time, Blackmun suggests, without explicitly stating
it, that birth makes a real difference. Such a claim is arguably
implicit in his refusal to find that constitutional personhood' 6 and
actual human life" begin "before live birth."" In any event, Justice
Stevens, writing thirteen years later in support of Roe, makes clear
the necessity of what we above called the "birth wall." Concurring
in a 1986 case,' 9 he insists that "there is a fundamental and wellrecognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed,
if there is not such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the

life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures."" In the next sentence, Stevens makes clear that, in his
view, even "the 9-month-gestated,
fully sentient fetus on the eve of
2
birth" is not yet a human being. '
Stevens does not explain his claim that a fundamental nonhuman to human change at birth is required in order to justify legal
abortion; but one basis for his view is surely the principle of human
equality that underlies both our ethics and our law. There must be
a real and deep difference between human and non-human entities
in order to give force and limit to the normative demand for equal
protection for all humans. If all entities could be defined at will into
and out of humanity, human equality would have no practical
significance. Insofar as human equality does make practical
demands on us, it follows that we are committed to ontological
realism. Stevens has to claim a split in nature between fetus and
infant in order to avoid recognizing a right to life in principle equal
which no one any longer believes, he might have found far more agreement that the continuity
and dignity of developing human life demand its protection.
16. 410 U.S. at 156-59. Blackmun concludes that the fetus at no stage possesses
constitutional personhood before asking whether the fetus counts as a living human being.
Thus Roe must clearly be read to be wholly nominalist with regard to the legal name "person,"
even if not with regard to the extra-legal name "human being," since Blackmun thinks that
the extent of that legal appellation can be ascertained by looking only at positive law, without
yet considering natural realities.
17. Id. at 161-62.
18. Id. at 161. Blackmun is not explicit about what I have called "the birth wall" only in
that he does not state in so many words that actual human life exists even after birth, nor
does Roe explicitly condemn postnatal killing. However, the opinion does say that there "has
always been strong support for the view that life does not begin until live birth," and it seems
fair to read Blackmun in 1973 as not taking a culturally radical stance favoring infanticide.
Id. at 160.
19. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986). Casey overruled Thornburgh insofar as the lower court in Thornburgh gave
insufficient weight to the state interest in protecting prenatal life. 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992).
20. 476 U.S. at 779.
21. Id. The clarity of Stevens' birth wall depends on the highly plausible assumption that
he would consider a newborn baby to be "a human being." Certainly, there is no hint in his
opinion of the openness to infanticide discussed later in this essay.

260

WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW

[Vol. 9:255

before and after birth. 22 Only if expulsion from the womb gives the
fetus a human nature for the first time is virtually elective late-term
abortion easily justifiable.
The position of Justices Blackmun and Stevens has a prima
facie appeal. It is easy to imagine that the fetus is being constructed in the womb, piece by piece, by external forces. Just as it
would seem purely stipulative to insist that an automobile suddenly
comes into existence at some mid-production point in the factory, so
too the exact point at which a fetus in mid-production becomes a
human being could seem a mere matter of nominalist labeling. On
the other hand, we tend to agree that an automobile is present once
it rolls out of the factory onto the street, and likewise that the fetus
is definitely a human being once it emerges "complete" from the
womb.
The Blackmun-Stevens conceptualization of life does have
serious problems, however. No one thinks that merely coming out
of the factory door changes what is not a car into a car. Indeed,
those earlier ages that lacked modern biological knowledge, and so
falsely imagined that a fetus is put together solely by outside forces
rather than developing itself, all took the external construction
phase to be complete sometime considerably prior to birth-often at
what they called "animation" or "quickening," which they believed
manifested that a soul had been added and had taken charge of its
own development." Furthermore, the newborn infant is not yet
"complete" in the sense that the automobile out on the street is
complete. Newly born human life goes on developing itself for years
after birth, continuing a process that began at conception. Nevertheless, the common, quasi-conscious belief that humans are
constructed in the womb and are complete when born surely lent
and lends an initial plausibility to the legal birth wall built by the
Court in Roe.
We were thus bequeathed a curious antinomy by Roe. We were
to presume that the unborn child or fetus has no inner nature of its
own. What it is called is a matter of convention or preference, for it
is not "really" anything at all. At the same time, we had to assume
22. This is not to say that fetal location might not dictate different techniques of
protection. Consider, for example, the German abortion cases (see infra notes 71-73, and
accompanying text), which hold that despite the unborn child's constant right to life
throughout pregnancy, abortion may sometimes go unpunished in order to facilitate protective
counseling.
23. For example, see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *125. See also RONALD
DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM 41-42 (1993); JOHN KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: SOME ASPECTS OF
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF ABORTION IN ENGLAND FROM 1803-1982 (1988).
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that birth is a bright line, a moment when (in reality, not merely in
convention) by leaving the uterus, simply by passing through the
birth canal, the fetus becomes undeniably one of us. In other words,
we were to be skeptical nominalists before birth, but credulous
realists about birth itself.
It should have been obvious, even to Justice Stevens, that the
notion of a clear, fundamental difference at birth was not viable.
For one thing, the many postmodern nominalists among us,
especially among academics, could hardly accept the assertion that
a bright line between non-human and human exists at birth. If
definition in principle is a social construct, those who have the
political will to do so (i.e., those interested in protecting the unborn
or in justifying infanticide) must inevitably deconstruct Stevens'
definition of humanity.
Yet even realists must reject, in the end, the birth wall thesis,
because it claims that what something is depends upon where it is.
It makes the fundamental nature of the perinatal entity depend
solely upon location. Location, however, cannot determine a being's
inner nature, though location may well affect how that being
functions for others and thus affect what others name it. Birth
often matters so much to parents-the child can be held, its sex can
finally be known-that they give it a new common as well as proper
name. But it is their relationship, not the child, that is new.
The jurisprudence of Justices Blackmun and Stevens thus
abjured the search for the nature of the fetus before birth, where a
realist would search it out, while relying on a common sort of naive
realism about birth itself, where the fetus-infant difference cannot
be more than nominal. In more concrete terms, Justices Blackmun
and Stevens would have us believe the child born prematurely at
seven months to be a human being, while its more developed cousin
in the womb overdue at nine and a half months is still a creature
without a fundamentally human nature. Without an appeal to some
supernatural change, such as the insertion of a soul at first breath,
an appeal which neither judge makes nor constitutionally could
make, such a belief is-upon reflection-simply irrational, beyond
the limits of even the most extreme credulousness.
The Casey Court Breaches Roe's Wall
The absurdity of the birth wall did not cause it to fall immediately. The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed Roe v. Wade in
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1992, in its decision Planned Parenthood v. Casey,' but it did so
without claiming that birth really makes a difference, explicitly
avoiding any claim that the Court rightly decided Roe in the first
place. Instead, Casey based the right to abort in large measure on
stare decisis,25 the Anglo-American doctrine of binding precedent,
which is for Casey a doctrine of Court vanity and legal positivism.
The Court, according to Casey, cannot overturn past decisions just
because they reached the wrong conclusion."
Fidelity to the

Constitution is not by itself a sufficient reason to right old wrongs.
Erroneous holdings can only be overturned based on new information not available to the earlier Court.27 Except in those circumstances, correcting past mistakes would undermine the Supreme
Court's prestige, the Court argued in Casey, particularly so on
matters of great controversy.28 Roe's abortion fiat stands, but only
24. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). The
joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter spoke for a majority of the Court with
regard to its statement of holdings. However, its arguments were joined by a majority only
with regard to its reasons (e.g., its strong doctrine of stare decisis) for reaffirming the core
holdings in Roe and the medical emergency provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statutes
at issue; it also commanded a majority in its argument for striking down Pennsylvania's
spousal notification provision. The arguments of the joint opinion do not represent a majority
with regard to its reasons for upholding most sections of the Pennsylvania statutes (e.g. the
informed consent provisions) nor for overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) or Thornburgh. As to these non-majority portions of the
joint opinion, Justices Stevens and Blackmun would have preferred stronger abortion rights
arguments, while Justices Rehnquist, White, Scalia, and Thomas would have preferred
weaker abortion rights arguments.
25. Referring to the cases upholding a constitutional right to contraception, the Court says
clearly, "We have no doubt as to the correctness of those decisions." 505 U.S. at 852. The
Court then contrasts its view of Roe, stating that "the reservations any of us may have in
reaffirming the central holding of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty
we have given combined with the force of stare decisis." Id. at 853.
26. The Court stated:
Because neither the factual underpinnings of Roe's central holding nor our
understanding of it has changed (and because no other indication of weakened
precedent has been shown), the Court could not pretend to be reexamining the
prior law with any justification beyond a present doctrinal disposition to come
out differently from the Court of 1973. To overrule prior law for no other reason
than that would run counter to the view repeated in our cases, that a decision
to overrule should rest on some special reason over and above the belief that a
prior case was wrongly decided.
Id. at 864.
27. The Court lists various sorts of such new information: unworkability in practice, no
significant reliance on the erroneous decision, later contrary case law, and changed factual
understandings. Id. at 855.
28. Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), the decision approving racial segregation, was
wrongly decided from the beginning, according to Casey. 505 U.S. at 863. Nevertheless, it
was appropriately overturned by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) only
because the "facts, or an understanding of facts, changed from those which furnished the
claimed justifications for the earlier constitutional resolutions." 505 U.S. at 863. Had no new
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as such. Not willing to deny that abortion destroys existing human
life, the majority in Casey says simply that the Court has spoken,
causa finita est. Referring to "the interest of the State in the
protection of 'potential life,'"29 also characterized as "a legitimate
interest in promoting the life or potential life of the unborn,"3 ° the
decisive joint opinion of Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Anthony
Kennedy, and David Souter went on to declare:
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members
of the Court when the valuation of the state interest came before
it as an original matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court
did, that its weight is insufficient to justify a ban on abortions
prior to viability even when it is subject to certain exceptions.
The matter is not before us in the first instance, and coming as
it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are
satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of
Roe's resolution of the issue, but the precedential force that must
be accorded to its holding. And we have concluded that the
essential holding of Roe should be reaffirmed.31
Despite this belabored support for Roe, anti-abortionists could
be pleased with Casey, in that, because the Court no longer assumed
as dramatic a transformation at birth, the identity of the child
before and after birth could be affirmed in American law, provided
always that the ultimate right to abortion be preserved. The law
could recognize the essential continuity of human life. Realism
could begin to replace nominalism with regard to prenatal development. If the child has real dignity outside the womb, it must have
dignity inside, since location cannot make an ontological difference.
In the words of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, "Regulafactual understandings emerged, concededly unconstitutional racial segregation would have
remained the law of the land, according to the Casey doctrine. The Court provides a broad
discussion of how its need to be perceived as legitimate may require it to reaffirm precisely
those decisions it regards as extremely wrong. Id. at 864-69. "There is a limit to the amount
of error that can plausibly be imputed to prior Courts." Id. at 866. To exceed that limit would
mean that the "legitimacy of the Court would fade with the frequency of its vacillation." Id.
Concluding, the Court writes, "[a) decision to overrule Roe's essential holding under the
existing circumstances would address error, if error there was, at the cost of both profound
and unnecessary damage to the Court's legitimacy, and to the Nation's commitment to the
rule of law." Id. at 869.
29. Id. at 871.
30. Id. at 870.
31. Id. at 871. Although this portion of the Casey opinion was joined in only by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, when the votes of the four justices who wished to overrule
Roe entirely (Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and White) are added in, there is a solid majority
of seven that refuses to endorse Roe's reasoning, along with a bare majority of five in favor of
reaffirming its core holdings.
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tions which do no more than create a structural mechanism by
which the State ...may express profound respect for the life of the
unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman's exercise of the right to choose." 2
For example, laws requiring a woman contemplating abortion
to be fully informed about the procedure, including what it does to
the fetus, were declared constitutional by Casey, overruling a
contrary 1983 holding that read Roe to forbid state attempts to
dissuade women from having abortions. 3
Even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the State may enact
rules and regulations designed to encourage her to know that
there are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that
can be brought to bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to
full term ....
Measures aimed at ensuring that a woman's choice contemplates the consequences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere
with the right recognized in Roe ......
Though it still used the opaque and demeaning phrase
"potential life," as well as the words "life" and "child," 6 for the
human fetus, the Casey decision clearly permitted state antiabortion laws to be motivated by the "legitimate goal of protecting
the life of the unborn,"3 7 so long as their purpose remained "to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth"38 rather than forcibly to
stop her from choosing abortion.3 9 Indeed, already in the 1989
Webster case, the birth wall had weakened to the point where the
Court had upheld Missouri legislation requiring the unborn child,
from the moment of conception, to be treated as a legal person

32. Id. at 877. Again, seven justices would uphold such regulations. See comment at
supra note 31.
33. Id. at 882, overruling Akron and Thornburgh insofar as each case gave insufficient
"acknowledgment of an important interest in potential life .... "
34. Id. at 872. Note the opinion's explicit affirmation that there are non-religious,
'philosophic and social arguments" against abortion.
35. Id. at 873.
36. E.g., id. at 871. The Casey opinions use the terms "life or potential life" and "life of the
unborn." Id. at 825, 870, 883. The pro-Roe majority of the Court goes so far as to refer to the
"life of the child his wife is carrying," in denying a father's rights. Id. at 898. If the four antiRoe dissenting justices were added, this would mean that the Court unanimously affirms the
existence of the "life of the child" in the womb.
37. Id. at 883.
38. Id. at 878.
39. Id. at 879.
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except insofar as the decisions of the Supreme Court might otherwise require.4 °
In addition to informed consent, Casey approved a minimum
twenty-four hour period of reflection between the time the pregnant
woman is given the required information and the actual abortion.4
Casey's "[plersuade, but do not actually block," principle need not
stop there. After the Court decided that case, for example, Pennsylvania initiated a system of state subsidies for non-religious, pro-life
crisis pregnancy centers, the sort that had previously subsisted
almost solely on private contributions and volunteers.4 2
Since women already in a crisis pregnancy can be given
accurate factual information43 intended to encourage them to choose
life, it follows that public high school students, even as part of a
required curriculum, can receive such information in circumstances
more likely to promote calm reflection. Information may well be
more effectively integrated into personal decision-making if it is
provided before a pregnancy-induced sense of desperation. Such an
educational initiative began a few years ago in Florida."
In a sense, the outcome in Casey was not surprising. The Court
never explicitly extended Roe's birth wall beyond abortion itself.
Where the constitutional right to abortion has not been at issue, as
in the Missouri case mentioned above, the Supreme Court has long
40. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1989). The Court in
Webster reversed a federal appellate decision holding that Roe did not permit states to
consider the fetus a human being and a person in regulations affecting abortion. However,
the Court approved the Missouri requirement only as a statement of principle, leaving itself
room to invalidate some applications at a later date, if thny had the effect of actually stopping
any abortions. Before Webster, only the Supreme Court decisions approving state refusal to
fund or otherwise affirmatively support abortion had clearly permitted states to act on a fetusas-human-life point of view in connection with abortion. See e.g., Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519,
521 (1977).
41. 505 U.S. at 885-87.
42. Joseph Esposito, In Pennsylvania, the Futureof the Pro-Life Movement?, NAT'L CATH.
REG., May 24-30, 1998, at 16.
43. Note that, although Casey definitely permits the state to take the pro-life side in
seeking to dissuade people from abortion, the three-Justice opinion assumes that all informed
consent materials will be "truthful and not misleading" and "aimed at ensuring a decision that
is mature and informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth
over abortion." 505 U.S. at 882-83.
44. See J. C. Willke, Public Schools Can Teach Pro-Life:Few Realize This, Fewer Still Do
It, LIFE ISSUES CONNECTOR, Apr. 1998, at 1. The article discusses the efforts of John Beasley
and his group entitled "Freedom to Learn," which aims at getting every public school in
America to openly teach "both sides" of the abortion issue. If the State claimed to be teaching
the pros and cons of abortion, then Casey would require teachers to present both sides, as Dr.
Beasley urges. But if the State, for example, were simply to insist that all biology students
be told about the facts of fetal development, I do not see why pro-abortion arguments (i.e.,
claims of overpopulation) would need to be introduced into the curriculum. Dr. Beasley may
be reading Casey less generously than he could from a pro-life perspective.
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been indulgent regarding state action designed to recognize and
protect fetuses. 45 At no point post-Roe has the Court ever struck
down any of the many state laws punishing the killing of a fetus
without its mother's permission, thus treating the fetus as a second
victim of an assault on its mother.46 In Minnesota, for example, an
assailant who intentionally destroys ajust-conceived human embryo
by battering its mother can be sentenced to life in prison for
"murder of an unborn child," 47 even if the mother was on the way to
an abortion clinic at the time.
From a pro-choice perspective, the bad news announced in the
Casey decision was that Roe's birth wall had been further dismantled, permitting greater recognition and protection for the fetus.
Realism seems to be replacing nominalism prior to birth.
Yet there was also bad news from a pro-life point of view in
Casey. The newly-conceded weakness of the birth wall, the
absurdity of thinking that a fetus's new location ex utero could
suddenly bestow a human nature upon it, would seem also to permit
nominalism to expand into and after birth. The concession that
there is no real change at birth helps pave the way to the Stenberg
partial-birth decision.
Casey freed the law to be more consistently pro-life or more
consistently pro-choice. The path chosen turns on the status of
infants during and after birth.
The Stenberg Court DisregardsLocation
Roe v. Wade rested necessarily on at least two pillars: the
principle that a change in location can bring about a change in
nature, and the further proposition that passage out of the uterus
and into the light causes such as a transubstantiation. The exact
moment of this momentous shift from sub-human to human life-at
45. For example, in 1998, the Court refused to review the South Carolina Supreme Court's
decision upholding a state statute punishing drug use by pregnant women as a form of "child
endangerment." Whitner v. South Carolina, 523 U.S. 1145 (1998). In this memorandum
decision, the Court let the South Carolina Supreme Court decision stand without comment.
Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
46. According to the anti-abortion Americans United for Life, twenty-nine states now treat
the killing of an unborn child as a form of homicide, including legislation recently enacted in
Idaho and Nebraska. See Americans United for Life, States the ProhibitCrimes Against the
Unborn Child, at http'//www.americansunitedforlife.orglguides/flfh-statutes.htm (visited
Sept. 14, 2002).
47. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318, 321 n.1 (Minn. 1990), cert. denied 496 U.S. 931
(1990) (the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected a defendant's argument that he was being
treated unfairly in being prosecuted for killing an embryo or fetus less than one month after
conception when others could commit the same act with impunity).
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the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of the birth process-was
explicitly left undecided by Roe, as explained in its first footnote.4"
The thirty states prohibiting partial-birth abortion seem clearly
to have intended to track those two foundations of Roe. At least one
of Stenberg's important amicus briefs, that of Louisiana and
Mississippi, had focused on changed fetal location as the justification for greater fetal protection.4 9 The prestigious American Medical
Association had used Roe-like language to support the bans, arguing
that partial-birth abortion is "ethically different from other

destructive abortion techniques because the fetus, normally twenty
weeks or longer in gestation, is killed outside the womb." ° Three of
the four dissenting opinions picked up and emphasized this point as
well."
Yet the majority opinion in Stenberg not only refuses to permit
greater protection to a child mostly born, it claims not to see how
location could matter at all. Recall that before birth, even after fetal
viability, Roe had acknowledged a state interest in protecting the
fetus only as "the potentiality of human life."52 The majority in
Stenberg notes that Nebraska, the state prohibiting partial-birth
abortion whose law was before the Court, "describes its interests
differently. It says the law... 'prevents cruelty to partially born
children'. ... But we cannot see how the interest-related differences could make any difference to the question at hand, namely,
the application of the 'health' requirement."53 For the majority of
48. The Court in Roe recognized:
Article 1195, not attacked here, reads:
"Art. 1195. Destroying unborn child
Whoever shall during parturition of the mother destroy the vitality or life in a
child in a state of being born and before actual birth, which child would
otherwise have been born alive, shall be confined in the penitentiary for life or
for not less than five years."
410 U.S. at 118.
49. Brief of Amici Curiae Louisiana and Mississippi in Support of Petitioners, 2000 WL
228483, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000). The brief cites Justice Marshall's oral
statement during Roe's 1972 re-argument that killing a child in the process of birth "is not an
abortion." Id. at *4. It also points to various medical authorities which say that pregnancy
has already ended once birth has begun, concluding that to uphold partial-birth abortion
would "transform the right to terminate pregnancy into a new constitutional right to kill a
child even after the pregnancy is terminated." Id. at *14. The brief remarks concisely
"Viability' is about gestation; 'partial birth abortion' is about location." Id. at *13.
50. 530 U.S. at 1007 (dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas)(emphasis in original).
51. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas emphasized location, but Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his very brief dissent, did not.
52. 410 U.S. at 164-65.
53. 530 U.S. at 930-31. Note that by applying a maternal health standard, the Court
seems to focus on post-viability partial-birth abortions, in that before viability there is a right
underRoe to a fully elective abortion, not just to abortion for health reasons. 410 U.S. at 164.
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the Court, a state interest in "partially born children" counts no
more than a state interest in the "potentiality of human life" when
balanced against maternal health.
If, under Roe, birth could make a difference, how can the
majority not find that partial birth could also make a difference?
The Court in Roe would surely have said that a mother could not
take the life of her fully ex utero child for reasons of psychological
"health"-as she has a right to do just before the beginning of birth.
How can the Stenberg majority not at least acknowledge and
respond to Nebraska's argument that the almost born should be
treated almost like the born? The Court writes instead as though
location could not possibly make a difference.
Even more surprising is Justice Stevens' concurring argument
in Stenberg. Recall that he had averred earlier that there "is a
fundamental and well-recognized difference" between "the 9-monthgestated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth" and "a human
being."54 Yet in Stenberg he found the state's distinction between a
fetus on the eve of birth and a fetus almost fully born to be "simply
irrational," so absurd as to make the law in question unconstitutional on the basis of its irrationally alone.55 Indeed, Justices
Stevens and Ginsburg dismiss with disdain the claims on behalf of
the nearly born child as mere "rhetoric" and "emotional uproar."56
One might have thought that the majority in Stenberg would
wish to reinforce Roe's birth wall, to make the naively realistic claim
that location can at times make a deep difference, but that partial
birth is not one of those times because the fetus still lacks those last
crucial inches. In so arguing, the Court could politically have
strengthened both foundations of Roe. Instead, the Stenberg
majority and concurring opinions treat both location and the process
of birth as utterly irrelevant to any constitutional permission to
protect human life. They smash the twin pillars of Roe, even as
they extend its reach.
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg go on to cite with approval the
prior appellate court argument of Judge Richard Posner, whose
similar opinion supporting partial-birth abortion makes even more
obvious its judicial dismissal of Roe's naive realism. Posner writes
candidly

54. 476 U.S. at 779.
55. 530 U.S. at 946-47.
56. Id. at 948, 951. See also discussion supra notes 5-7. The remaining concurring
opinion, that of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, likewise gives no weight whatsoever to fetal
location, but without the disdain shown by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg.
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From the standpoint of the fetus, and, I should think, of any
rational person, it makes no difference whether, when the skull
is crushed, the fetus is entirely within the uterus or its feet are
outside the uterus.57
[T] here is no meaningful difference between the forbidden
and the privileged practice. No reason of policy or morality that
would allow the one would forbid the other.58
Line drawing is inescapable but the line between feticide
and infanticide is birth. Once the baby emerges from the
mother's body, no possible concern for the mother's life or health
justifies killing the baby. But as long as the baby remains
within the mother's body, it poses a potential threat to her life
or health and this threat presents a compelling case (or so at
least the Supreme Court believes) for a right of abortion.59
Judge Posner mocks the state's attempt to draw a line between
those still fully unborn and those mostly born, and then proceeds to
rely on another, quite similar "line drawing"-words that imply a
largely nominal difference -between the mostly born and the fully
born. Even if letting an infant emerge a few more inches alive could
somehow endanger its mother's health, this possibility could not
make the nearly born child any less a real human being or
"baby"-as Posner himself names it both within and without the
mother's body. Surely, "from the standpoint of the fetus," as Posner
puts it, its place of destruction on either side of Posner's "fully born"
line would not matter.60
Suppose a doctor considered it better for an aborting mother's
health not to reach into her body at all, but rather to let the child be
fully born naturally and then kill it by omission of care. Either way,
the child is equally dead. Despite Posner's nominal adherence to
the remnants of Roe's old birth wall, by the logic of his argument,
and that of the Stenberg opinions, it would be wholly irrational to
deny the mother a healthier abortion simply because death would
be imposed on the fetus after it had emerged from the womb.
57. Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 879 (7th Cir. 1999).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 880. Posner's "fully born" line is one of location alone, in that it does not
correspond to the onset of a parental relationship (as discussed supra, in seeking to
understand the Blackmun-Stevens birth wall). That relationship has already begun prior to
birth. Appellant Hope Clinic, an abortion provider, currently advertises that its aborting
"physician has the capability to reconstitute the head with a jelly like substance. This allows
a grief-stricken couple to hold their baby wrapped in a blanket, say good-bye, and take an
important first step in a very long and difficult grieving process." The Hope Clinic for Women,
Ltd., Types of Abortions, at http'//www.hopeclinic.com/typesofab.htm (visited Sept. 14, 2002).
60. Hope Clinic, 195 F.3d at 879-80.
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This is not in fact a fanciful supposition. A number of
hospitals6 have made fully live-birth abortion a practice, presumably for reasons of maternal health.62 Labor is induced and then the
unwanted newborn is simply abandoned to die. After this practice
was revealed in Chicago, a proposed Illinois law requiring "reasonable" care for any child born alive in an abortion was defeated when
the American Civil Liberties Union alleged its unconstitutionality
and threatened to sue the state.'
61. Nurse Callson Governor to Initiate a 'Live Birth Abortion' Moratoriumin Illinois, ILL.
LEADER, Aug. 5, 2002, availableat http//illinoisleader.com/news/newsview.asp?c=1518 (in
addition to the Swedish Hospital Medical Center, five Chicago hospitals admit to having
performed the live birth abortion procedure).
62. Mental health reasons may be especially important. "[Elmotional closure of the
termination event may be reached sooner with an LI [labor introduction abortion] than with
a DE [dilation and evacuation abortion, i.e. one involving dismemberment] because a woman
is conscious for the entire process, and there is an intact fetus to say 'good bye' to." Sandy
Coe, Comparisonof Second Trimester TerminationMethods, GENETICS NORTHWEST, Vol. XII,
No. 2, Dec. 1998, at 5, availableat http:J/mchneighborhood.ichp.edu/pacnorgg/GNW/121998/
121998GNWtabmethod.pdf. Labor introduction was chosen over dilation and evacuation
by over a third of the women (114 for LI, to 204 for DE), and may have been the only
termination method available "after 20-21 weeks" in this study. "Partial birth abortion" or
"DX" is not mentioned as an option. An accompanying article explains further: "Our labor and
delivery unit supports all families experiencing a loss by taking pictures and footprints,
completing a certificate of life and having families see and hold their babies when possible and
desired." Mary Myers, Reflections on the Role of a Chaplain,GENETICS NORTHWEST, Vol. XII,
No. 2, Dec. 1998, at 2, availableat http://mchneighborhood.ichp.edu/pacnorgg/GNW/121998/
121998GNW-chaplain.pdf. A patient's own report reads as follows:
[Wie chose to have a D&E, as opposed to induced birth. With all the facts
they gave us, we felt that this would be the least amount of risk.
As the day grew near, I was having increasing difficulty accepting the decision
we had made. I just couldn't deal with the thought of never meeting my child.
Full-term or not, she was still my baby. I knew that I needed to do all the same
things I did with my first child. I needed to count fingers and toes, see what she
looked like, and even to dream about what the future might have been if all was
well ....
We arrived at the hospital the next morning, unsure whether or not it was too
late to change our decision. Much to our relief, it was not. The nurse took us to
the maternity ward to induce labor. Four hours later, I was holding my baby
girl. Although she was too weak to survive the birth, I was still able to say
goodbye. The staff was very understanding; they left us so that we could be
alone with our daughter. We had named her Melissa Faith the night before ....
The pain was no less, my grieving time no shorter; but giving birth to my
daughter gave me the closure I needed. I was able to meet her, and to say
goodbye to her. I did count her fingers and toes, and I know that she looks like
her dad and older sister. I couldn't imagine not having a chance to see her and
do these special things.
Receiving Abnormal Prenatal Diagnosis Results - Consumer Experiences, GENETICS
NORTHWEST, Vol. XII, No. 2, Dec. 1998, at 10, available at
http'//mchneighborhood.ichp.edu/pacnorgg/GNW/121998/121998GNW abnlresults.pdf (there
is clearly some consumer demand for pushing abortion past birth).
63. Dave McKinney, Bill ProposesCarefor FetusAfterAbortion, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 31,
2001, at 1; John O'Connor, Care Rejected for Aborted Live Fetuses, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 10,
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All Abortion Rights Are at Stake in the Debate over Infanticide
Perhaps it has always been inevitable that the birth wall would
fall, even without Stenberg's battering ram. Naive realism focusing
on location has never made sense, as we have seen. Indeed, support
for postnatal infanticide has long been nearly universal among
academic supporters of Roe-for they could never discover Stevens'
"fundamental difference" between a nearly born fetus and a
newborn infant.
I am thinking here of people like Joseph Fletcher,' Michael
Tooley,' Ronald Green,66 Jonathan Glover," Peter Singer,' and
perhaps Steven Pinker,69 but to my knowledge they represent not
just a majority, but a very solid consensus. A survey by Don
Marquis in the Journal of Philosophy showed that all pro-choice
theories developed by 1989 deny that there is anything prima facie
wrong with killing newborn infants.7" I know of no pro-Roe scholars
who have written that there is something intrinsicallywrong with
early postnatal infanticide. The reason is obvious: if the newborn
has inherent or intrinsic dignity, then the same child located in the
2001, at 42. The ACLU spokesperson alleged an unconstitutional burden on pre-viability
abortions. The legislation is still blocked in Illinois. See ILL. LEADER, supra note 61. For
additional details regarding the hospital practices, see Born-Alive Infants ProtectionAct of
2000:HearingBefore the Subcomm. on the Constitutionof the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
106th Cong. 35-39 (2000) (statement of Jill Stanek, Registered Nurse in the Labor and
Delivery Department at Christ Hospital in Oak Lawn, Illinois).
64. "The only difference between the fetus and the infant is that the infant breathes with
its lungs. Does this make any significant difference morally or from the point of view of
values? Surely not .... True guilt arises only from an offense against a person, and a Down's
is not a person." Joseph Fletcher, The Right to Die: A Theologian Comments, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Apr. 1968, at 62-64.
65. Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanticide, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (1972).
66. Ronald M. Green, ConferredRights and the Fetus, 2 J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 55 (1974).
67. JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 137-69 (1977).
68. Peter Singer, Killing Babies Isn't Always Wrong, THE SPECTATOR, Sept. 16, 1995, at
20-22 (Singer has been appointed Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University's Center for
Human Values).
69. Steven Pinker, Why They Kill Their Newborns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 2, 1997, at 52.
See the illuminating commentaries on Prof. Pinker's article: John Leo, Litmus Test, Slippery
Tools, 24 HUMAN LIFE REV. 105 (1998); George McKenna, Tough Talk on "Neonaticide",24
HUMAN LIFE REV. 85 (1998); James Nuechterlein, Infanticide for Beginners, 24 HUMAN LIFE
REV. 78 (1998). Pinker later denied that his article had supported infanticide as opposed to
providing explanations for it.
70. Don Marquis, Why Abortion is Immoral, 86 J. PHIL. 183, 195-201 (1989) (showing that
extant pro-choice theories all deny that there is anything prima facie wrong with killing
infants). Nevertheless, Glover (and perhaps Pinker and others) would permit some (not full)
legal prohibition of infanticide in order to avoid "side effects" of killing infants. GLOVER, supra
note 67.
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womb just prior to birth must have equal dignity. Thus if Roe's
right to abortion all the way up to birth is to be protected, the
human dignity of the newborn must be denied.
More is at stake, however, than simply the fate of infants just
before, during, and just after birth. Thoughtful supporters of
abortion know that postnatal infanticide must be, in principle,
permissible if even very early abortion is to be legitimated. If the
human infant has real worth then even the just-conceived human
embryo must have a like worth, for the only significant dignity
possessed by the newborn is possessed as well by the embryo:
human nature, membership in our species, or-what comes to the
same thing--design for human community, with its virtues of
reason and love.
To say that actual manifestation of these virtues, rather than
simply design or potency for them, is required for human dignity
would be to exclude the infant along with the embryo. To focus
upon the actualized traits already exhibited by the infant but not
the embryo (i.e., greater size, more pleasant appearance, ability to
survive with less external life support) would be to include many
non-human entities and, moreover, would be to point to traits that
are ultimately just not very important to our equal human dignity.
For these very reasons, the German Constitution Court ruled
unanimously in 1975, 7' with an entirely different panel reaffirming
unanimously in 1993,72 that the constitutional right to life must
extend to the unborn throughout pregnancy. Since we know that
newborn infants have human dignity, despite the fact that their
uniquely human virtues subsist only as active design or potency, we
cannot deny that same dignity to the embryo. In that court's own
realist words:
71. Judgment of the First Senate of the 25th of February, 1975, 39 BVerfGE 1, translated
in Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v.
Wade, 9 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAC. AND PROC. 605 (1976).

72. Judgment of the Second Senate of the 28th of May, 1993, 88 BVerfGE 203. For a clear
summary, see Donald Kommers, The ConstitutionalLaw of Abortion in Germany: Should
Americans PayAttention?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY. 1 (1994); Gerald L. Neumann,
Casey in the Mirror:Abortion, Abuse and the Right to Protection in the United States and
Germany, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 273 (1995). Note that although the 1975 decision was ambiguous
to a degree about whether the unborn child itself possesses the right to life, as opposed to
being only the beneficiary of constitutional protection, the 1993 decision clearly resolves the
matter in favor of the child having his or her own right. Richard Stith, On Death and
Dworkin:A Critiqueof His Theory of Inviolability, 56 MD. L. REV. 289, 295 n.28 (1997). See
also Udo Werner, The Convergence of Abortion Regulation in Germany and the United States:
A Critique of Glendon's Rights Talk Thesis Abortion Regulation in Germany & the U.S., 18
LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 571 (1996). The German cases do not directly address the
question of the legal status of the embryo prior to implantation, and they permit pro-life
counseling to be the means of protecting the child's life, rather than criminal punishment.
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The process of development which has begun at that point is a
continuing process which exhibits no sharp demarcation and
does not allow a precise division of the various steps of development of the human life. The process does not end with birth; the
phenomena of consciousness which are specific to the human
personality, for example, appear for the first time a rather long
time after birth. Therefore, the protection of [the Basic Law]
cannot be limited either to the "completed" human being after
birth or to the child about to be born which is independently
capable of living. The right to life is guaranteed to everyone who
"lives"; no distinction can be made here between various stages
of the life developing itself before birth, or between unborn and
born life.7"
The crux of the abortion debate today, therefore, is the status
of the just born. The birth wall is nearly gone, and the embryo and
infant survive or perish together. The legal treatment of infanticide
will have, in principle, a decisive influence on the future of abortion
rights.
The outcome of this infanticide debate is by no means certain.
Despite strong opposition by the National Abortion and Reproductive Rights Action League (NARAL) in 2000, when the bill was first
introduced,74 the federal Born-Alive Infants Protection Act (H.R.
2175) passed the House of Representatives by voice vote on March
12, 2002, the Senate by unanimous consent on July 18, 2002, and
was signed into law by President Bush on August 5, 2002. 7' The
statute makes clear that, for federal purposes, a newborn infant "at
any stage of development" is a legal person once it is completely
expelled or extracted and "breathes or has a beating heart ...
regardless of whether the umbilical cord has been cut," and
"regardless of whether the expulsion or extraction occurs as a result
73. Jonas & Gorby, supra note 71, at 638.
74. NARAL called the "Born-Alive Infants Protection Act" (then numbered H.R. 4292) an
'anti-choice assault" because it would "effectively grant legal personhood to a pre-viable fetus
-in

direct conflict with Roe-and would inappropriately inject prosecutors and lawmakers

into the medical decision-making process." NATIONAL ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
ACTION LEAGUE, NARAL STATEMENT, ROE V. WADE FACES RENEWED ASSAULT IN HOUSE: ANTICHOICE LAWMAKERS HOLD HEARING ON SO-CALLED "BORN-ALIVE INFANTS PROTECTION ACT"

(2000), availableat http://www.nrlc.orgFederal/Born Alive_Infants/NARALonlive-born.pdf.
Although it passed the House 380-15 on September 26, 2000, the bill died in the Senate at the
end of that congressional session. For a detailed analysis of the content and politics of the bill
by its primary academic author, see HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO
CHOOSE 234-94 (2002).
75. Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Meets Rescued Miners, Saying They Represent Spirit of
America, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2002, at A10.
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of natural or induced labor, caesarian section, or induced
abortion." 6 The bill says it does not affect the legal status or legal
rights of "any member of the species homo sapiens at any point prior
to being 'born alive' as defined in this section," yet by this very
language the new law makes clear both the humanity of the unborn
child and that its right to life at every stage of pregnancy depends
solely on location.77
Lawmakers supporting abortion chose not to renew opposition
to the bill this year because, in their view, the bill simply restates
existing law. v" This may well have been a strategic mistake. The
law's deep challenge to abortion rights could not be clearer.79
76. Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (2002).
77. The bill was quite short. Its entire text reads as follows:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002".
SEC. 2. DEFINITION OF BORN-ALIVE INFANT.
(a) IN GENERAL-Chapter 1 of title 1, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
"§8. 'Person', 'human being', 'child', and 'individual' as including born-alive infant
"(a) In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States, the words 'person', 'human being', 'child', and 'individual',
shall include every infant member of the species homo sapiens who is born alive
at any stage of development.
"(b) As used in this section, the term 'born alive', with respect to a member of the
species homo sapiens, means the complete expulsion or extraction from his or
her mother of that member, at any stage of development, who after such
expulsion or extraction breathes or has a beating heart, pulsation of the
umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, regardless of whether
the umbilical cord has been cut, and regardless of whether the expulsion or
extraction occurs as a result of natural or induced labor, cesarean section, or
induced abortion.
"(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to affirm, deny, expand, or
contract any legal status or legal right applicable to any member of the species
homo sapiens at any point prior to being 'born alive' as defined in this section.".
(b) CLERICAL AMENDMENT--The table of sections at the beginning of chapter
1 of title 1, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new item:
"8.'Person', 'human being', 'child', and 'individual' as including born-alive
infant.".
Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-207, 116 Stat. 926 (2002).
78. Bumiller, supra note 75.
79. President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Signing of H.R. 2175, Born
Alive
Infants Protection
Act
(Aug.
5,
2002),
available at
httpJ/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020805-6.html. The President stated
"[U]nborn children are members of the human family, as well .... The Born Alive Infants
Protection Act is a step toward the day when every child is welcomed in life and protected in
law." Id. Besides Professor Hadley Arkes, whose writings had inspired the bill, those present
at the bill-signing ceremony included Jill Stanek, an original Chicago whistleblower nurse,
and Gianna Jessen, who is an abortion survivor. The new law's negative effect on the practice
of Labor Induction abortions, described supra notes 61-63, is clear. Hospitals seeking or
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During the greater part of pregnancy, only location distinguishes a
fetus without rights and a legal person with full rights, as long as
the fetal heart beats before and after birth. The stark and simple
reaffirmation of this contrast cannot but have a negative impact on
abortion rights insofar as they depend on a belief in the subhumanity of life in the womb.'
The statute does not rebuild Roe's naively realist wall, for it
does not claim that human life begins at birth. Rather, it affirms
the existence and dignity of postnatal life without denying the same
of prenatal life. While it erects a barrier to stop the right to choose
from expanding beyond birth, it in no way interferes with the right
to life expanding into pregnancy.
Can Abortion Rights Be Secured Without EndangeringPostInfantile Human Beings?
With greater foresight, perhaps, pro-Roe academics have been
working to protect abortion rights not only by arguing against any
right to life for infants irrespective of their location in or out of the
womb, but also by reassuring us that divesting newborns of the
right to life need not endanger those of us who matter most. These
thinkers often seek to discern a bright line at some post-infantile
stage of human life, a line at which true human dignity arguably
begins. For example, H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., once averred that
true personhood inheres only in the normal adult human."' Such
scholars still seek to be realists; they just want to think that what
really matters begins quite a bit later than birth. In their favor it
must be admitted that almost any developmental point they might
choose (i.e., self-consciousness, the age of reason, even puberty)
would be more real and so more arguable than Roe's choice of
extrauterine location.
Can such points, however, remain bright lines in the
postmodern era? If the self is a cognitive illusion, as some argue, 2
risking live-birth abortions must be prepared either to spend enormous sums to care for quite
premature infants or else face potentially serious federal penalties.
80. The question remains, of course, whether the post-StenbergCourt will uphold the law
despite its focus on location.
81. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., On the Bounds of Freedom: From the Treatment of
Fetuses to Euthanasia,40 CONN. MED. 51 (1976). A convert to Orthodox Christianity, Prof.
Engelhardt has since changed his views. But see also the quotation from Tooley, infra note
83. The other writers listed supra notes 64-69, although tolerant of infanticide, also aver
limits to homicide later in the human life span.
82. For a deconstruction of various concepts of the self, see RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY,
RELATISM, AND TRUTH 113, 123 (1991).
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how can self-consciousness really matter? If reason is only
manipulation, an epiphenomenon of the will to power, why should
it be more significant than, say, muscles? It is vain to suppose that
new attempts to build real walls against killing can be successful in
our age of deconstruction.
Rather than search for a new bright line after birth, more
perspicacious pro-Roe jurists have opted to rid themselves of the
principle to which we pointed early in this essay, a principle that
makes it necessary to have real walls and bright liies in the first
place: human equality. If human beings can be treated in radically
gradated ways, if they need not even in principle be accorded equal
protection under the law, then those who favor abortion rights
should be disturbed neither by the continuity of human life nor by
the Born-Alive Infant Protection Act's recognition of every fetus as
a person as soon as it passes through the birth canal. If discriminatory treatment of human beings is acceptable, Stevens' need to
assert a fundamental difference between fetus and infant disappears. Why bother wracking one's brain to find a real difference
between them if they need not be shown equal respect, even
granting their common humanity and personhood?
Among academics, Ronald Dworkin has perhaps done the most
to advance human inequality in the law. "The less profitable effort
invested in each human being, the less regrettable the killing of that
being" paraphrases an inegalitarian notion that Dworkin applies
long after as well as before birth.'
Some American federal appellate judges, even prior to the
Stenberg case, have likewise cut directly to the quick. Seeking to
justify lesser state protection for the lives of those terminally
disabled, Judge Roger Miner wrote in 1996 for the Second Circuit,
"Surely, the state's interest [in protecting a life] lessens as the

83. See Richard Stith, On Death and Dworkin:A Critique of His Theory of Inviolability,
56 MD. L. REV. 289 (1997) (criticizing RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT

ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993)). Michael Tooley has
suggested slightly less elastic criteria dividing postnatal humans into the stages of nonpersons, quasi-persons and persons:
New-born humans are neither persons nor even quasi-persons, and their
destruction is in no way intrinsically wrong. At about the age of three months,
however, they probably acquire properties that are morally significant, and that
make it to some extent intrinsically wrong to destroy them. As they develop
further, their destruction becomes more and more seriously wrong, until
eventually it is comparable in seriousness to the destruction of a normal adult
human being.
MICHAEL TOOLEY, ABORTION AND INFANTICIDE, 411-12 (1985).
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potential for life diminishes."' For the Ninth Circuit in the same
year, Judge Stephen Reinhardt wrote:
Although the state's interest in preserving life may be unqualified, and may be asserted regardless of the quality of the life or
lives at issue, that interest is not always controlling. Nor is it of
the same strength in each case. To the contrary, its strength is
dependent on relevant circumstances, including the medical
condition and the wishes of the person whose life is at stake.8"
Judge Robert Beezer, writing in dissent, countered that the
court is thus reexamining "the historic presumption that all human
lives are equally and intrinsically valuable," and that this reexamination may be "a mere- rationalization for house-cleaning, costcutting and burden-shifting-a way to get rid of those whose lives
we deem worthless. 8
Perhaps because of Judge Beezer's forceful challenge, Judge
Reinhardt sought to bolster his case with the Supreme Court's Roe
jurisprudence denying equal protection to the unborn:
In right-to-die cases the outcome of the balancing test may differ
at different points along the life cycle as a person's physical or
medical condition deteriorates, just as in abortion cases the
permissibility of restrictive state legislation may vary with the
progression of the pregnancy. Equally important, both types of
cases raise issues of life and death .... 7
Judge Beezer did not attempt to deny the majority's analogy to
abortion law, only to narrow it:
[I]n the abortion context, the Supreme Court tells us that the
state's interests in fetal life are weaker before viability than they

84. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729 (2d Cir. 1996).
85. Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 817 (9th Cir. 1996). Note
that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed both the Compassionin Dying and Quill decisions, and
has not at this time endorsed Miner's and Reinhardt's inegalitarian argument. See Vacco v.
Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). On the other
hand, the Supreme Court has not required that the lives of infirm persons be protected

equally; it has only approved a state interest in so doing:
The State's assisted-suicide ban reflects and reinforces its policy that the lives
of terminally ill, disabled, and elderly people must be no less valued than the
lives of the young and healthy, and that a seriously disabled person's suicidal
impulses should be interpreted and treated the same way as anyone else's.
521 U.S. at 732
86. 521 U.S. at 856-57.
87. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 800-01.
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are once the fetus becomes viable. A state's interest in preserving human life is stronger when applied to viable beings than it
is when applied to nonviable beings. Like a first-trimester fetus,
a person kept alive by life-sustaining treatment is essentially
nonviable. A terminally ill patient seeking to commit physicianassisted suicide, by contrast, is essentially viable. The patient
may be inexorably approaching the line of nonviability. But the
patient is still on the viable side of that line, and consequently
enjoys the full protection of the state's interest in preserving
life.88
Of course, since even fully viable fetuses enjoy nowhere near the
"full protection" of the Constitution under Roe and Casey, Judge
Beezer's analogy is cold comfort even for the disabled person capable
of surviving without life supports. If such a person counts only as
much as a viable fetus, he or she will get far less than equal
protection from our law.
In denying the constitutional duty of equal
protection, were
these appellate judges doing anything more than following the lead
of Casey? In holding that Roe must stand even if it was wrongly
decided, Casey had proclaimed that the State's duty of equal
protection fell before stare decisis and the prestige needs of the
Court. Reinhardt and Beezer had read that case well. Will "the
thoughtful part of the Nation" 9 grade the rest of us and decide the
State's interest in preserving each of our lives?
The fall of any location-based wall, the end of Roe's naive
realism, thus cuts in two directions. The fact that the same being
exists within and without the womb can lead to two opposite
conclusions. The law can cut back on abortion rights and begin to
treat the unborn with respect more nearly equal to that which we
still show to already-born human beings, or it can reaffirm abortion
and treat some of those already born with the same disrespect we
have shown toward the unborn. We can become more realistic
about the entire human life span, or we can begin to doubt the
human nature of others thought unwanted and incompetent. Or we
may finesse the whole problem of nominalism versus realism by
denying the State's duty of equal protection, leaving those less
perfect to their own devices regardless of whether they are human
in nature or only in name.

88. Id. at 851 (citations omitted).
89. 505 U.S. at 864 (relying on "the thoughtful part of the Nation" to decide fetal and
maternal rights).

